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A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF  
PRIVATE JUDGING 
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
A commonly cited reason that businesses include arbitration clauses in their 
contracts with consumers is to avoid jury trials.1  From the perspective of busi-
nesses, replacing a jury with an arbitrator “provides much-needed protection 
from the unpredictability of jury awards, which, in recent years, have been 
known to reach astronomical heights—awards that appear inappropriate even 
to the most objective observer.”2  From the perspective of consumer advocates, 
businesses choose arbitration to “decrease their likely payout” by avoiding 
juries, which they believe “will often be sympathetic to the claims of a consumer 
against a large company.”3  Underlying these competing perspectives are dif-
fering views of jury and arbitral decisionmaking.  From the business perspec-
tive, juries make awards that are “too high” and thus overcompensate consumer 
claimants.  From the consumer advocates’ perspective, arbitrators make awards 
that are “too low” and thus undercompensate consumer claimants. 
Stated otherwise, a central issue in the debate over predispute consumer 
arbitration clauses is whether juries or arbitrators make “better” decisions—
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 1. E.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference 
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 684 (1996) (“One of the company’s chief goals in selecting 
arbitration over litigation is generally to avoid a jury trial.”).  There are, of course, a number of other rea-
sons businesses might include predispute arbitration clauses in their standard-form contracts, such as con-
fidentiality, reduced availability of class relief, and so on. 
 2. Martin J. Oppenheimer & Cameron Johnson, A Management Perspective: Mandatory Arbitration 
Agreements Are an Effective Alternative to Employment Litigation, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1997, at 19; 
see Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Alternative to Litigation Attracting Consumer Financial Services 
Companies, in ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES DISPUTES 845-48 (Alan S. Kaplinsky 
ed., 1999) (stating that arbitration “eliminates irrational jury verdicts”). 
 3. Sternlight, supra note 1, at 684; see Margot Saunders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and 
Appropriate Remedial Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 137 (2002) (“Creditors use arbitration clauses 
as a shield to prevent homeowners from litigating their claims in a judicial forum, where a consumer 
friendly jury might be deciding the case.”); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Busi-
ness: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 60  
(arguing that businesses “prefer arbitration to litigation for their patterned, repetitive disputes with minor 
players” because of “[l]ower damage awards” in arbitration). 
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that is, which decisionmaker more accurately assigns liability and awards dam-
ages given the facts of a case and the governing legal standards.  This issue is 
necessarily a comparative one, as no legal decisionmaker is infallible.4  A full 
comparison of jury and arbitral decisionmaking is well beyond the scope of this 
Article.  Instead, this Article focuses on an aspect of arbitral decisionmaking 
that has been largely unexamined: the extent to which decisionmaking by arbi-
trators is affected by heuristics (“rules of thumb”) and cognitive biases.5 
Much attention has been given to how such “cognitive illusions” affect deci-
sionmaking by juries.  The experimental results have been summarized as fol-
lows: 
 Decades of research on juries indicates that cognitive illusions adversely affect the 
quality of adjudication.  Researchers have found, for example, that juries believe that 
litigants should have predicted events that no one could have predicted, allow irrele-
vant or inadmissible information to influence liability determinations, defer to arbi-
trary numerical estimates, and rely on incoherent methods to calculate damages.6 
Less, albeit increasing, attention has been given to how cognitive illusions affect 
decisionmaking by judges.  The experimental studies to date, while mixed, have 
found that judges are less affected by some cognitive illusions, but similarly 
affected by others.7 
Almost no attention, however, has been given to how cognitive illusions 
might affect arbitral decisionmaking.8  This Article extends the behavioral 
 
 4. See Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decision-
making by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 164 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) 
(“Several legal scholars have pointed out that the appropriate standard by which to evaluate the quality of 
jury performance is not some absolute benchmark of perfection, but rather the performance of the most 
likely alternative factfinder, the trial judge.  Or, to extend the argument, the arbitrator, or the expert tri-
bunal.”). 
 5. See generally HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGEMENT (Thomas 
Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahne-
man et al. eds., 1982); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).  For overviews of the literature from a legal perspective, see, for exam-
ple, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, 
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1051 (2000); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal 
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and 
Economics: A Progress Report, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115 (1999).  For a cautionary view, see Gregory 
Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analy-
sis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002) [hereinafter Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seri-
ously?]; Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for 
Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002) [hereinafter Mitchell, Equal 
Incompetence]. 
 6. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780-81 (2001). 
 7. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 8. The effect of cognitive illusions on consumer decisionmaking has been cited as a possible justifica-
tion for increased regulation of predispute arbitration clauses in standard-form contracts.  Sarah Rudolph 
Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements 
Between Employers and Employees, 64 U. MO. K.C. L. REV 449, 482 (1996); Sternlight, supra note 1, at 
692-93.  A central question is the extent to which market forces may protect consumers who, for whatever 
reason—cognitive illusions, high information costs, and so forth—do not protect themselves.  Christopher 
R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 765-66.  The mere presence of an 
arbitration clause in a consumer contract does not necessarily mean that the business drafting the contract 
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analysis of the legal system9 to private judging, and considers the implications of 
that analysis for the debate on predispute consumer arbitration clauses.  
Empirical evidence on the effect of cognitive illusions in arbitral decisionmak-
ing is extremely limited.  Further complicating the analysis of private judging 
are structural differences between arbitration hearings and jury trials that may 
heighten or dampen the effect of cognitive illusions on decisionmaking in the 
real world.  Nevertheless, assuming arbitrators are more like judges than jurors 
in their decisionmaking—a seemingly reasonable assumption—studies com-
paring the effect of cognitive illusions on judges and jurors provide at least a 
starting point for making predictions about arbitral decisionmaking.  On this 
view, this Article tentatively concludes that, like judges, arbitrators may be less 
susceptible to at least some cognitive illusions than are jurors. 
If subsequent research bears out this tentative conclusion, it would have 
important implications for the ongoing debate over consumer arbitration.  If 
arbitral decisionmaking is less subject to the effects of cognitive illusions than 
jury decisionmaking, then the use of arbitration may improve the accuracy of 
dispute resolution, reducing the risk of overcompensation rather than resulting 
in undercompensation.10  This is not to suggest that utilitarian arguments about 
the nature of legal decisionmaking should be used to override constitutional 
protections,11 or that juries might not serve other functions beyond dispute 
resolution.12  Instead, the point is simply that when Congress and other policy-
makers consider whether to restrict the enforceability of consumer arbitration 
agreements, they should not assume that juries necessarily make “better” deci-
sions than arbitrators. 
 
is taking advantage of the consumer.  Limitations on consumer decisionmaking, such as cognitive biases 
and the use of heuristics, while certainly one consideration in evaluating whether the use of arbitration 
benefits or harms consumers, are by no means the only one.  One often overlooked consideration is the 
extent to which business reputation and similar market sanctions may counteract the take-it-or-leave-it 
nature of many consumer form contracts.  Id. at 767-69; see RICHARD CRASWELL & ALAN SCHWARTZ, 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 322-23 (1994) (“Sellers who use unreasonable terms get a reputation 
for having undesirable contracts.”). 
 9. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cau-
tious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 739 (2000) (noting that the field is variously referred to as “the 
psychology of judgment and decision-making,” “behavioral economics,” and “behavioral decision 
theory”). 
 10. Even if arbitral decisionmaking is comparable only to jury decisionmaking, this would indicate 
that some criticisms of consumer arbitration are overstated. 
 11. See Sternlight, supra note 1, at 733 (“Whatever the arguable benefits of binding arbitration over 
litigation, our Constitution states that jury trials are to be preferred over arbitration.”).  For discussions of 
jury-trial rights and arbitration, see id. at 671; Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the 
Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669 (2001) 
[hereinafter Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration]; Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutional-
ity of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation 
of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 76-78 (1997). 
 12. E.g., ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 51-64 (2001) (discussing the politi-
cal and socializing roles of juries); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 249 (1986) 
(“[P]olitical functions of the jury are not to be ignored.  They coexist with the fact-finding functions and 
should be considered in judging the jury’s role in society.”). 
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Part II provides an overview of cognitive illusions relevant to decisionmak-
ing by judges, jurors, and arbitrators.  Part III summarizes empirical studies that 
shed light on the effect of cognitive illusions on arbitral decisionmaking.  Part 
IV examines structural differences between jury decisionmaking and arbitral 
decisionmaking that may increase or decrease the effect of cognitive illusions.  
Part V concludes with a call for more research. 
II 
HEURISTICS AND COGNITIVE BIASES:  
AN OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO JURORS 
Experimental studies suggest a number of ways in which human behavior 
systematically departs from a rational-actor model.  This Part describes several 
such “cognitive illusions”—hindsight bias, anchoring, the representativeness 
heuristic, and extremeness aversion—and examines their application to legal 
decisionmaking, particularly by jurors.13  Certainly there is reason to be cautious 
about applying laboratory results to real-world settings. But given how juries 
are selected and jurors’ freedom from market incentives, if any legal decision-
maker is susceptible to cognitive illusions, the jury seems the most likely, even 
taking into account institutional devices for lessening their influence. 
A. An Overview of Heuristics and Cognitive Biases 
1. Hindsight Bias 
“Hindsight is 20/20,” the saying goes.  Once people know that an event has 
occurred, it is extremely difficult for them to ignore that occurrence when 
evaluating the probability that the event would occur in the first place.14  As 
Baruch Fischhoff explains: 
In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in fore-
sight.  They not only tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable but 
also to view it as having appeared “relatively inevitable” before it happened.  People 
believe that others should have been able to anticipate events much better than was 
actually the case.  They even misremember their own predictions so as to exaggerate 
in hindsight what they knew in foresight . . . .15 
 
 13. Cognitive biases are psychological “biases and aversions that can lead [people] to inaccurate 
perceptions of facts.”  Sunstein, supra note 5, at 135.  Heuristics are “mental shortcuts” that are often 
useful but sometimes result in mistaken decisions.  See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychologi-
cal Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (2003); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 139 (“Heuris-
tics are not biases, and often they are good, because they economize on decision costs; but they can lead 
to several mistakes.”).  I use the phrase “cognitive illusions” to refer collectively to cognitive biases and 
heuristics. 
 14. E.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 799-801; Jolls et al., supra note 5, at 1523-27; Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 576 
(1998). 
 15. Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, 
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 5, at 335, 341. 
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Of course, not all uses of hindsight in decisionmaking are inappropriate.16  If 
people learn by experience, one would expect them to increase their estimates 
of the probability of future events based on past events.  Moreover, “the fact 
that something happened provides some information about the risky behav-
ior.”17  “Hindsight bias” occurs when the influence of hindsight on judgment 
exceeds that which is justifiable. 
Experimental studies have found hindsight bias in a variety of decision-
making settings.18  For example, Kim A. Kamin and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski 
administered a problem based on the well-known tort case of In Re Kinsman 
Transit Co.19  to a group of experimental subjects.20  In Kamin and Rachlinski’s 
study, subjects in the “foresight condition” were asked to determine whether 
the risk of a flood was such that the city should hire a bridge operator during 
winter months when the drawbridge was not used.  Subjects in the “hindsight” 
condition were told that hiring a bridge operator could have prevented debris 
from becoming lodged under the bridge and causing a flood.  Both were asked 
to decide whether the city should have hired a bridge operator.21  Only 24% of 
the subjects in the foresight condition required the city to hire a bridge opera-
tor, while 57% of the subjects in the hindsight condition held the city liable for 
failing to hire a bridge operator.22  Kamin and Rachlinski concluded that “out-
come knowledge deeply affected participants’ interpretations of a complex 
story.”23  Moreover, attempts to ameliorate hindsight bias by use of mock jury 
instructions were unsuccessful.24 
 
 16. See Mark Kelman et al., Decomposing Hindsight Bias, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 251, 252 
(1998) (distinguishing among primary, secondary, and tertiary hindsight bias). 
 17. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 138. 
 18. See, e.g., Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias, 
20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 511 (1996) (reporting that hindsight bias affected mock jurors’ “ratings 
of the foreseeability of violence” and their “opinions of how well therapists fulfilled their duty”); see 
also Rachlinski, supra note 14, at 576-81 (listing studies).  For a critical view, see Jay J.J. Christensen-
Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORG’L BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 147, 162 (1991) (“The results of this meta-analysis revealed that the overall 
effect size . . . of the hindsight bias is not large.”); Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?, supra 
note 5, at 1963 (“[H]indsight bias is not necessarily the juggernaut that Professor Rachlinski and other 
legal decision theorists portray it to be.”). 
 19. 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964). 
 20. Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post • Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995). 
 21. Id. at 93-94.  Of those subjects in the hindsight condition, some also received jury instructions that 
sought to reduce the effect of hindsight bias.  Id. 
 22. Id. at 98. 
 23. Id. at 99. 
 24. See id. at 98.  Indeed, according to Jeff Rachlinski, “the psychological research demonstrates that 
the hindsight bias is an extremely robust phenomenon,” and attempts to ameliorate the bias through vari-
ous “debiasing” techniques have proven only partially successful at best.  See Rachlinski, supra note 14, at 
586-88.  But see Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 
31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1299-1313 (1999) (arguing that “use of several [debiasing strategies] has the poten-
tial to reduce the [hindsight] bias enough to raise serious questions about the wisdom of adopting reforms 
that could significantly favor defendants”); Merrie Jo Stallard & Debra L. Worthington, Reducing the 
Hindsight Bias Utilizing Attorney Closing Arguments, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 671, 682  (1998) (“[T]he 
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The significance of hindsight bias for legal decisionmaking is obvious: In any 
number of contexts, juries and other legal decisionmakers are required to 
evaluate conduct in retrospect and estimate the likelihood that an uncertain 
event would occur.  Examples include determinations of whether a party was 
negligent, whether conduct was reasonable, and whether a contractual contin-
gency was foreseeable.25 
2. Anchoring 
In estimating a numerical amount, people tend to start with some initial 
value—an “anchor”—and then come up with a final estimate by making 
adjustments to the anchor.  If the anchor provides useful information about the 
underlying value (such as the list price), and if people make reasonable adjust-
ments, this “anchor and adjustment” heuristic can be a useful decisionmaking 
approach.  But anchoring can be problematic if people start with an irrelevant 
anchor or fail to make adequate adjustments to the initial value.26  For example, 
in one study, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman asked subjects to estimate 
various percentages, such as the percentage of countries in the United Nations 
that are African.  The starting point for the estimates was a number from one to 
100 spun on a “wheel of fortune”—an obviously irrelevant number.  The sub-
jects were then asked to state whether the correct number was higher or lower 
and by how much.  The median estimate by subjects given ten as the starting 
number was that 25% of the countries in the United Nations were African; the 
median estimate by subjects given sixty-five as the starting number was 45%.27 
A number of studies have found that the amount of damages claimed by the 
plaintiff serves as an anchor for verdicts rendered by mock juries.28  Gretchen B. 
 
use of a debiasing strategy [in defense attorneys’ arguments] significantly reduced the number of subjects 
who believed the defendants were negligent.”). 
 25. Rachlinski, supra note 14, at 593 (“Good faith assessments of what constitutes a reasonable course 
of action in foresight can easily be judged unreasonable in hindsight.  Although the hindsight bias also 
might affect judgments of subjective knowledge or foreseeability, these theories lack empirical support. . . . 
[I]t seems likely that the bias does affect these two types of judgments, however.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 787-90; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 5, at 1100-02; Sun-
stein, supra note 5, at 141; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 762 
(2003) (“The most sensible conclusion is that whenever people are uncertain about appropriate values, 
anchors have a significant effect, and sometimes a startlingly large one.”). 
 27. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 5, at 1128. 
 28. Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s Requests and Plaintiff’s 
Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW  & HUM. BEHAV. 445, 463 (1999) (“We observed a large 
effect of the plaintiff’s award request. . . . [T]he more the plaintiffs requested, the more they got.  The dif-
ference in median awards between the Low Anchor ($15-50 million) and High Anchor ($50-150 million) 
conditions was $35 million for an identical fact situation.  The judge’s instructions that these arguments by 
the attorneys were not evidence did not eliminate this dramatic effect.”); John Malouff & Nicola S. 
Schutte, Shaping Juror Attitudes: Effects of Requesting Different Damage Amounts in Personal Injury 
Trials, 129 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 491, 495 (1989) (“The primary finding of the present experiment was that 
when more money was requested by the plaintiff’s attorney, the jurors awarded more.”); Allan Raitz et al., 
Determining Damages: The Influence of Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Decision Making, 14 LAW & HUM.  
BEHAV. 385, 393 (1990) (“There is also evidence that jurors in the no expert condition may have 
‘anchored’ on a figure presented at trial.”); W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathe-
matics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 329 (2001) (finding that “[r]espondents, in effect, abandon the constraints 
imposed by the deterrence value table and base their judgments [of the appropriate punitive damages 
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Chapman and Brian H. Bornstein studied the effect of plaintiff demands on 
mock jury verdicts and found that (1) “the amount requested . . . serves as an 
anchor that affects compensation awards,” and (2) “this effect is linear, even 
with the extreme amounts used in [the] study,” which ranged from $100 to $1 
billion.29  The title of their study summarizes their findings: The More You Ask 
For, the More You Get.30  To the extent irrelevant numbers involved in the liti-
gation process alter the damages awarded by juries (and judges and arbitrators 
as well), awards may be higher or lower than is appropriate. 
3. The Representativeness Heuristic 
People tend to predict the likelihood that an event or person falls within a 
certain category based on whether the characteristics of the event or person 
seem representative of the category.  This “representativeness heuristic” can be 
useful, but it can also lead to mistakes when people rely too heavily on the 
characteristic and too little on the rate at which a characteristic occurs in the 
underlying population (the “base rate”).31  In one study, for example, Tversky 
and Kahneman described to subjects a woman who had been a philosophy 
major in college and “was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and 
social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.”32  When 
asked whether it was more likely the woman was a bank teller or a bank teller 
involved in the feminist movement, almost 90% of the subjects chose the latter.  
But logically, the class of bank tellers includes the class of feminist bank tellers, 
such that necessarily the woman is more likely to be a bank teller than a femi-
nist bank teller.  The subjects failed to consider the base rate, instead putting 
too much weight on characteristics that appeared representative of the smaller 
class.33 
 
amount] largely on the anchoring influence” of the amount requested by the plaintiff).  As another exam-
ple, studies have found that statutory damages caps served as anchors for awards of compensatory and 
punitive damages.  See Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors for Damage Awards 
in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 991, 1016 (1995) (finding that damage awards tend 
toward damages limits); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: 
The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 361, 366 (1999) (finding that high 
caps resulted in higher damages). 
 29. Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask For, the More You Get: 
Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 526-27 (1996). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 805-08; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 5, at 1085-87. 
 32. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 5, at 84, 92-93.  For a discussion of criticisms of the “Linda problem” 
(so called because of the name given to the woman by Tversky and Kahneman), see Keith E. Stanovich & 
Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?, in 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 5, at 421, 433-34.  For a skeptical view, see Gerd Gigerenzer, How to 
Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond “Heuristics and Biases,” 2 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 83, 90-
101 (1991). 
 33. A related heuristic is availability, in which people tend to disregard base rates and place too much 
weight on memorable events.  E.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 5, at 1127-28.  Jolls et al. cite “anec-
dote-driven environmental legislation” as an example, explaining that the availability heuristic “encour-
ages the well-known ‘pollutant of the month’ syndrome, in which regulation is driven by recent and 
memorable instances of harm.”  Jolls et al., supra note 5, at 1518.  Some supporters of increased regulation 
of consumer and employment arbitration have sought to take advantage of this heuristic, citing anecdotal 
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In the context of legal decisionmaking, commentators have relied on the 
representativeness heuristic to justify rules of evidence, such as the inadmissi-
bility of character evidence.34  The fear is that jurors will disregard the relevant 
base rate and instead place too much weight on the evidence of bad character.35 
4. Extremeness Aversion 
Individuals may seek to avoid extreme results.  Experimental studies have 
found that adding an extreme third option alters the choices subjects make 
between two other options, even if the third option provides no relevant infor-
mation about the other two choices.36  For example, in a study by Itamar Simon-
son and Tversky, subjects who had been asked to choose between two cameras, 
one costing $169.99 and one costing $239.99, were evenly split between the two.  
A third option was then added: a camera costing $469.99.  With the camera 
costing $239.99 now the intermediate option, the percentage of subjects choos-
ing it increased, even though there was an additional choice available.37  
According to Cass Sunstein, such “[e]xtremeness aversion gives rise to com-
promise effects.  As between given alternatives, most people seek a compro-
mise.”38  The implications of extremeness aversion for the legal system are 
straightforward: to the extent legal decisionmakers have an aversion to extreme 
outcomes, “[o]ther things being equal, juries and judges may well try to choose 
a compromise solution.”39 
B. Application to Real-World Jurors 
As this discussion illustrates, behavioral studies of legal decisionmaking 
raise serious questions about the accuracy of decisionmaking by jurors.  Indeed, 
these studies have prompted some commentators to suggest the possibility of 
reducing the role of juries in the civil justice system.40  An important caveat, 
however, is that the extent to which the results of experimental studies using 
 
instances of allegedly abusive arbitration practices as evidence of the need for new legislation.  E.g., 
Senator Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS., 281, 
281 (2002). 
 34. FED. R. EVID. 404(a). 
 35. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 5, at 1087-88. 
 36. E.g., Schlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, How Much Is Investor Autonomy Worth?, 57 J. FIN. 
1593, 1610 (2002) (“Consistent with extremeness aversion, [a given investment program] is the least attrac-
tive when framed as an extreme choice and most attractive when framed as the middle choice.”); Mark 
Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 290-95 (1996) 
(reporting that subjects were more likely to choose a verdict of murder over manslaughter when murder 
was intermediate option). 
 37. Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aver-
sion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281, 290 (1992). 
 38. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 135.  Extremeness aversion is a form of context dependence, because 
the preferences of the subjects vary depending on the context in which the choice is made.  Kelman et al., 
supra note 36, at 288. 
 39. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 136. 
 40. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1182-84 
(2002); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26, 60 (1999). 
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mock jurors apply to real-world decisionmaking by jurors cannot be known for 
certain. 
To be sure, some criticisms of experimental studies are not particularly 
applicable to juries. For example, one reason to doubt the effectiveness of 
experimental results in predicting real-world outcomes is the effect of selection.  
As Richard Posner explains: 
Selection effects suggest that the experimental and real-world environments will differ 
systematically.  The experimental subjects are chosen more or less randomly; but 
people are not randomly sorted to jobs and other activities.  People who cannot 
calculate probabilities will either avoid gambling, if they know their cognitive weak-
ness, or, if they do not, will soon be wiped out and thus be forced to discontinue 
gambling.  People who are unusually “fair” will avoid (or, again, be forced out of) 
roughhouse activities—including highly competitive businesses, trial lawyering, and 
the academic rat race.  Hyperbolic discounters will avoid the financial services indus-
try.  These selection effects will not work perfectly, but they are likely to drive a big 
wedge between experimental and real-world consequences of irrationality.41 
In contrast, the largely random selection of juries bears substantial similarities 
to the selection of subjects for experimental studies—indeed, some studies have 
used as subjects individuals waiting to serve as prospective jurors.42  This sug-
gests that the results of experimental studies may be more appropriately applied 
to jury decisionmaking than many other real-world activities. 
On the other hand, it is no doubt true that the vast majority of jurors take 
their responsibilities more seriously than do participants in experimental stud-
ies.  As Philip Peters explains: 
 Unlike research subjects, jurors are accountable for their decisions.  Each juror’s 
vote will be scrutinized not only by the other jurors, but also by the judge and often by 
the juror’s family and friends.  Jurors also feel accountable to their communities.  This 
accountability distinguishes jury trials from research studies and has the potential to 
improve jury decision-making.43 
Moreover, most experimental subjects receive far less information about the 
case they are asked to decide than real-world jurors, raising questions about the 
“ecological validity” of the experiments.44  Certainly other differences between 
experimental settings and real-world jury trials likewise have the potential to 
increase or decrease the effect of cognitive biases on the decisionmaking of 
jurors.  As a result, any conclusions from experimental studies in this area will 
necessarily have some degree of uncertainty. 
 
 41. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 
1570-71 (1998). 
 42. E.g., Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical 
Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 891 (1993). 
 43. Peters, supra note 24, at 1300-01.  On the importance of accountability (or lack thereof) in 
experimental studies, see Mitchell, Equal Incompetence, supra note 5, at 110-14; Philip E. Tetlock, 
Accountability and Complexity of Thought, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 74, 74-75 (1983) (“The 
evidence on the effects of accountability is thus mixed: sometimes accountability leads to complex or 
effortful information processing, and sometimes it leads to expedient decisions that can be readily justified 
to others.”). 
 44. See Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social Science 
Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867, 877 (1999); Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?, 
supra note 5, at 1985. 
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III 
HEURISTICS AND COGNITIVE BIASES  
IN ARBITRAL DECISIONMAKING 
The effects of cognitive illusions on jury decisionmaking have been studied 
often, at least in experimental settings.  The effects of cognitive biases on other 
legal decisionmakers, especially arbitrators, have been studied far less.  This 
Part discusses the available evidence on how heuristics and cognitive biases 
might affect arbitrators.  It begins by examining the extremely limited empirical 
research on cognitive illusions in arbitral decisionmaking.  Because that evi-
dence (experimental or otherwise) is so limited, this Part then considers evi-
dence on the effect of cognitive illusions on judicial decisionmaking.  The 
assumption inherent in this comparison is that the effect of cognitive illusions 
on arbitrators is more like their effect on judges than their effect on jurors.  If 
so, evidence on heuristics and cognitive biases from studies of judicial deci-
sionmaking may provide some insights into arbitral decisionmaking as well. 
The existing evidence on judges takes two forms: experimental studies of 
judicial decisionmaking and studies of litigation outcomes comparing the results 
of cases decided by judges and those decided by juries.  Taken together, these 
studies suggest that (1) judges are less affected by some cognitive illusions than 
jurors and equally, but no more, affected by others, and (2) these differences 
seem to persist in actual cases, although to a lesser degree than might be 
expected from the experimental studies alone.  While far from conclusive, this 
evidence suggests that arbitrators may be somewhat less subject to cognitive 
illusions than jurors. 
A. Empirical Studies of Arbitral Decisionmaking 
Empirical studies of the prevalence of cognitive illusions in arbitral deci-
sionmaking are exceedingly rare.  I am aware of no such studies using experi-
mental techniques.  Moreover, arbitration proceedings are private, and most 
arbitration awards are unpublished.45  As a result, studies of outcomes in com-
mercial (including consumer and employment) arbitration are uncommon.46 
 
 45. Cf. Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International Commer-
cial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 79, 122 (2000) (discussing international arbitration awards). 
 46. In addition to the studies discussed in this section, see the studies of employment arbitration out-
comes by Lisa B. Bingham.  Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997) [hereinafter Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect]; Lisa B. 
Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employ-
ment Arbitration Claims, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998) [hereinafter Bingham, On Repeat Players]; 
Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 873 (2002) [hereinafter Bingham, Self-Determination]; Lisa B. Bingham, Unequal Bargaining 
Power: An Alternative Account for the Repeat Player Effect in Employment Arbitration, in INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 50TH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 33 (1999) [hereinafter Bingham, 
Unequal Bargaining Power]; Lisa B. Bingham & Simon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After 
the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of Employment: 
Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD ANNUAL 
CONFERENCE ON LABOR (Samuel Estreicher ed., 2003). 
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One area in which some empirical work has been done is in testing whether 
arbitrators have a tendency to reach compromise awards—to “split the baby.”  
This phenomenon, if it exists, is sometimes credited to the anchoring of awards 
on the amount sought by the claimant.47  Compromise awards would also be 
consistent with extremeness aversion by arbitrators. Another suggested expla-
nation is that market forces give arbitrators an incentive to compromise, to 
keep both sides happy and willing to select the arbitrator again.48  The implica-
tions of arbitral incentives are less clear in the context of consumer and 
employment arbitration (although behavioral considerations would seem to be 
the same).  Individual consumers and employees are unlikely to be repeat play-
ers, so arbitrators have little incentive to reach compromise solutions to induce 
consumers and employees to select them again.  Attorneys for consumers and 
employees, however, may be repeat players.49 
Two published studies of commercial arbitration (one domestic and one 
international) have found no evidence that arbitrators make compromise 
awards.  In her classic study, Soia Mentschikoff examined commercial arbitra-
tions administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) between 
1947 and 1950.50  In 50% of the awards, the claimant was awarded either all or 
none of the amount sought.  “Obviously,” Mentschikoff concluded, “such 
awards can not be the result of compromise.”51  In addition, Mentschikoff 
examined more closely thirty-six additional cases, finding that “many of the par-
tial awards are arrived at in a judicial manner since they result from the striking 
of particular items of damage that the arbitrators believe are not justified under 
the facts or law of the particular case.”52 
A recent study of international arbitration awards by Stephanie E. Keer and 
Richard W. Naimark also rejected the view that arbitrators make compromise 
awards.53  In a sample of fifty-four international arbitration proceedings admin-
istered by the AAA, the mean award as a percentage of the amount claimed 
was 50.53%, and the median award was 46.66%.  The distribution of the 
awards, however, was bimodal, with 31% of claimants recovering nothing and 
35% recovering 100% of the amount claimed.  The remaining 34% of claimants 
 
 47. Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not “Split the Baby”—Empirical Evi-
dence from International Business Arbitration, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 573, 573-74 (2001). 
 48. Cf. Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 523 (1997) (“The dynamic 
of arbitrator self-interest has long been familiar in collective bargaining cases and is thought, for example, 
to provide one explanation for the apparently common practice of compromise awards.  Repeat business 
for the arbitrator is likely only if he is able to retain the future goodwill of both union and management; 
the desire to do so may give him an incentive (in the hallowed phrase) to ‘split the baby.’”). 
 49. See Drahozal, supra note 8, at 751; Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statu-
tory Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1355  (1997).  But see Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 
46, at 198-99 (“[T]here is reason to believe that most individual members of the plaintiffs’ bar may never 
successfully emerge as repeat players in employment arbitration.”). 
 50. Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 856-67 (1961). 
 51. Id. at 861. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Keer & Naimark, supra note 47. 
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were awarded a widely distributed percentage of the amount claimed.54  Keer 
and Naimark concluded that “the results from this study show emphatically that 
arbitrators do not engage in the practice of ‘splitting the baby.’”55  The studies 
examining the possibility of compromise awards thus have uncovered no evi-
dence of extremeness aversion in arbitral decisionmaking.56 
Several studies have sought to compare outcomes in arbitration and litiga-
tion, but they shed little light on behavioral aspects of arbitral decisionmaking. 
In one study, Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill compared a sample of 261 
AAA employment arbitration awards with verdicts in state-court employment 
cases and employment discrimination cases in federal court.57  Relying on the 
AAA’s categorization of the arbitration agreements as either “promulgated” by 
the company or individually negotiated by the employee, they found that win-
rates and awards in arbitrations arising under individually negotiated agree-
ments were largely indistinguishable from the outcomes in court cases.  They 
acknowledged, however, that they were unable to control either for “original 
differences in the merits of the disputes routed to arbitration and litigation” or 
for differences in settlements, which could undercut the comparability of dis-
putes in arbitration and litigation.58 
In another study, William Howard compared a sample of arbitration awards 
dealing with employment discrimination claims to court cases involving alleged 
employment discrimination.59  The mean jury award in the court cases studied 
was $417,178, while the mean arbitration award was $114,905.  Howard did not 
attempt to control for differences in the claims, such as the strength of the claim 
on the merits and the extent of injuries suffered.  Thus, at least some of the dif-
ference in recovery between court and arbitration likely is due to differences in 
 
 54. Id. at 574.  Keer and Naimark also describe an unpublished AAA study of 4,479 commercial arbi-
tration awards with results consistent with their findings.  Id. at 574 (finding that “approximately 42% of 
those cases were awarded 0-20% of their original claim amount,” while “30% were awarded 81-100% of 
their original claim amount”). 
 55. Id. at 578.  Neither study makes any attempt to compare the likelihood of compromise awards in 
arbitration to the likelihood of compromise judgments or verdicts in civil litigation. 
 56. An alternative interpretation of these results might be that extremeness aversion applies only to 
choices among discrete alternatives but not to choices along a continuum, as an arbitrator (or jury) would 
make in determining the amount of damages to award. 
 57. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical 
Comparison, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA, supra note 46.  For 
more detailed information on the AAA arbitration awards in the sample, see Elizabeth Hill, Due Process 
at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitra-
tion Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777 (2003) [hereinafter Hill, Due Process at Low Cost]; 
Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, DISP. RESOL. J., May-July 2003, 
at 9. 
 58. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 57, at 21-23.  Michael Delikat and Morris Kleiner found little differ-
ence in outcomes between employment arbitrations involving securities industry employees and employ-
ment discrimination cases litigated in federal court.  Michael Delikat & Morris Kleiner, Empirical Study of 
Securities Industry Arbitration v. Litigation, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE 
EMPLOYMENT ARENA, supra note 46.  They acknowledge, however, that they lacked data on “additional 
variables that may control for factors that may influence the outcomes of a trial or private sector adjudica-
tion.”  Id. at 7. 
 59. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What Really Does 
Happen?  What Really Should Happen?, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40. 
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the claims in the different fora, rather than differences between decisionmak-
ers.60 
Lewis Maltby compared the results of AAA employment arbitrations from 
1993 to 1995 with the results of employment cases litigated in federal courts in 
1994.61  He recognized that the cases were not comparable on the merits, noting 
that “[t]he district court cases all involved statutory civil rights claims for which 
the law provides emotional distress and punitive damages” while “[m]any of the 
AAA cases . . . were contract claims with only economic damages.”62  Maltby 
sought to control for the differing types of claims by comparing arbitration and 
litigation on the basis of damages awarded as a percentage of the amount 
claimed.  Under this approach, he found that employees recovered 18% of 
amounts claimed in arbitration, but only 10.4% of amounts claimed in court.63 
Donald Wittman has compared outcomes in jury cases with outcomes in 
court-annexed arbitration proceedings.64  Examining a sample of 353 cases tried 
both by an arbitrator and a jury (thus ensuring that the facts of the cases were 
the same), he found substantial similarities between jury decisionmaking and 
arbitral decisionmaking.65  Unfortunately, the results provide little insight into 
how arbitration awards in consumer and employment cases (in other words, 
arbitrations that are not court-annexed) compare to jury verdicts.  In Wittman’s 
study, arbitrators had a strong incentive to make an award close to the likely 
jury verdict in the case, and parties had a strong incentive to select arbitrators 
whose awards were accurate predictions of jury verdicts.66  Parties to predispute 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have no comparable incentive to 
prefer arbitrators whose awards mirror jury verdicts. 
Finally, Neil Vidmar and Jeffrey J. Rice conducted an experimental study 
that compared the damages awarded by jurors and arbitrators in a hypothetical 
medical malpractice case.67  They gave a description of the case to twenty-one 
 
 60. Id. at 45.  For further criticisms of Howard’s methodology, see Hill, Due Process at Low Cost, 
supra note 57, at 788-89. 
 61. Lewis Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, in ARBITRATION NOW 1, 
16-18 (Paul H. Haagen ed., 1999) [hereinafter Maltby, Private Justice]; see Lewis Maltby, Employment 
Arbitration: Is It Really Second Class Justice?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 23 [hereinafter Maltby, 
Second Class Justice].  Maltby used data on employment arbitration awards collected and reported by Lisa 
Bingham, see infra text accompanying notes 133-34. 
 62. Maltby, Private Justice, supra note 61, at 17-18. 
 63. Id. at 18.  For an alternative interpretation of Maltby’s results, see infra note 143. 
 64. Donald Wittman, Lay Juries, Professional Arbitrators, and the Arbitrator Selection Hypothesis, 5 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 61 (2003).  Robert MacCoun describes another, unpublished study by Wittman that 
“compared jury and arbitration awards and found that juries were more variable than arbitrators,” 
possibly due to “forum selection processes.”  MacCoun, supra note 4, at 164-65. 
 65. Wittman, supra note 64, at 80 (“[W]ith the exception of the deep pockets issue, the jury and 
arbitrator equations are very similar regarding both their coefficients and their sum of squared errors.”). 
 66. Wittman examined court-annexed arbitration conducted under a scheme whereby a party 
requesting a trial had to pay the arbitrator’s fee and other costs if the jury verdict was not more favorable 
to the party than the arbitration award.  Id. 
 67. Vidmar & Rice, supra note 42; see NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE 
AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS AND 
OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 221-35 (1995). 
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lawyers who had served as arbitrators “for various personal injury, contract, and 
labor disputes,” and eighty-nine prospective jurors who actually had been 
selected for jury duty.68  The median and mean damage awards by the two 
groups were statistically indistinguishable.69  The damage awards by the individ-
ual jurors, however, had a substantially higher variance (although when the 
individual awards were pooled into twelve-juror panels, the variance fell sub-
stantially).70 
Overall, the extremely limited empirical evidence on cognitive illusions in 
arbitral decisionmaking casts little light on how arbitral decisionmaking com-
pares to jury decisionmaking.  Arbitrators (at least in commercial cases) do not 
seem to be subject to extremeness aversion, and there is some experimental 
evidence that arbitral awards may have a similar mean but less variance than 
the verdicts of individual jurors.  Studies comparing outcomes in litigation and 
arbitration, while increasingly common, do not focus specifically on cognitive 
illusions and are subject to serious limitations due to case-selection effects.  At 
present, there is far too little evidence to draw firm conclusions. 
B. Empirical Studies Comparing Decisionmaking by Judges and Juries 
Notwithstanding the limited empirical evidence on heuristics and cognitive 
biases in arbitral decisionmaking, it may be possible to gain some insight into 
arbitral decisionmaking by examining judicial decisionmaking, a close but by no 
means exact analogy.  Arbitrators, like judges, resolve disputes on a recurring 
basis.71  Jurors’ experiences, by contrast, are limited to individual trials.  Arbi-
trators, like judges, receive specialized training; jurors receive only a judge’s 
instructions.  Many arbitrators, like judges, are lawyers.72  The vast majority of 
jurors are not. Demographically, too, arbitrators tend to look more like judges 
than jurors.73  The analogy is, of course, only a rough one.  Nevertheless, given 
 
 68. Vidmar & Rice, supra note 42, at 890-91. 
 69. Id. at 893. 
 70. Id. at 897-98; see also infra Part IV.A. (discussing potential differences between group and indi-
vidual decisionmaking). 
 71. See Mitchell, Equal Incompetence, supra note 5, at 153-54 (discussing the potential importance of 
“feedback and opportunities for learning” in reducing the effect of cognitive illusions). 
 72. Although lawyers and other professionals are subject to the effects of cognitive biases, some 
research suggests that they may be less affected than nonprofessionals.  See Chris Guthrie, Panacea or 
Pandora’s Box?  The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88 IOWA L. REV. 601, 641 (2003) (“This is not to 
say, of course, that lawyers are pure ‘rational actors’ who are impervious to the effects of ‘psychological 
biases’ in decisionmaking; in fact, lawyers, like other novice and expert decision-makers, are susceptible to 
such biases.  However, experimental evidence suggests that lawyers are more likely than others to be able 
to resist these biases and make decisions rationally.”).  Not all arbitrators are lawyers either.  Many arbi-
trators in trade association arbitrations, for example, are selected for their experience in the industry.  See, 
e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, 
Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1728 (2001).  But such experience itself could provide 
feedback and an opportunity to learn that might improve arbitral decisionmaking relative to juries.  See 
supra note 71. 
 73. Compare U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: HOW 
REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES 2 (1994), with Amy E. Black & 
Stanley Rothman, Shall We Kill All the Lawyers First?: Insider and Outsider Views of the Legal Profession, 
21 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 835, 838-42 (1998). 
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the lack of studies of how biases and heuristics affect arbitrators, studies com-
paring their effects on judges and juries may provide some insight.74 
1. Experimental Studies 
Only recently have researchers begun conducting experimental studies of 
cognitive illusions in judicial decisionmaking.  Although only a handful of such 
studies have been published, they have been broader in scope than the studies 
of arbitral decisionmaking.75  To date, the results are somewhat conflicting.  
Nevertheless, as a general matter, the studies have found judicial decisionmak-
ing to be less affected by cognitive illusions than decisionmaking by juries in 
some respects, but equally affected in others.76 
In one study, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich 
administered a questionnaire to federal magistrate judges attending a Federal 
Judicial Center workshop in 1999.77  A total of 168 judges returned the ques-
tionnaire, with one requesting that the response not be used in further research, 
leaving a sample of 167.  The questionnaire contained a series of hypothetical 
fact patterns designed to test for the effect of various heuristics and cognitive 
biases on judicial decisionmaking.  Based on the answers to the questionnaire, 
the authors concluded that judges were less affected by some cognitive illusions 
than jurors but similarly affected by others.  The judges “were impressive” in 
answering correctly “a difficult [evidentiary] question in a short period of time,” 
 
 74. The focus here is on studies that compare decisionmaking by judges and juries, rather than studies 
that consider one of the two (usually juries) alone.  For surveys of empirical research on jury decision-
making, see Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decisionmaking, 244 SCIENCE 1046, 
1046-50 (1989); MacCoun, supra note 4, at 137; Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: 
An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849 (1998).  For a survey of empirical studies focusing on 
punitive damage awards, see Jennifer Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and 
Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103 (2002). 
 75. In addition, experimental studies have compared hypothetical damage awards of judges and 
jurors, without explicitly considering cognitive illusions.  See, e.g., Stephen Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, 
A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Juries in Civil Liti-
gation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113, 125 (1994) (“[J]udges and jurors in civil cases react similarly when 
exposed to material that is subsequently ruled inadmissible—their perceptions of central trial issues are 
altered.”); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Punitive Damages Decision Making: The Decisions of Citizens and 
Trial Court Judges, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 315, 333 (2002) (“No differences were found in the likeli-
hood that punitive damages would be awarded or in the sizes of the punitive damages awards of judges 
and jury-eligible citizens.”); Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking about General Damages: A Com-
parison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 756 (1999) (“[T]he models evidence a 
remarkable degree of similarity among all groups of decisionmakers, plus a high degree of predictability, 
in regard to their judgments of injury severity.  As to the translation of injury perceptions into monetary 
awards, however, more differences among the groups appeared, and the predictive power of the models 
declined.”). 
 76. See Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 1200 (“Although few studies have been conducted on judges, 
what work has been done suggests that judges are also subject to the same cognitive errors in judgment 
that affect juries.”). 
 77. Guthrie et al., supra note 6.  For a study on hindsight bias using a sample of fifty-eight auditors 
and sixty-five state and federal trial judges, see John C. Anderson et al., Evaluation of Auditor Decisions: 
Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711, 730 (1993) (“[O]ur findings 
provide new evidence that individuals’ evaluations of auditor’s performance are dependent on outcome 
information.  Subjects provided higher auditor evaluations in the presence of favorable outcome informa-
tion and lower evaluations in the presence of unfavorable outcome information.”). 
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thereby avoiding the representativeness heuristic (although 60% still answered 
incorrectly).78  However, the results suggested that judges were as susceptible to 
anchoring effects and hindsight bias as other decisionmakers.79  Thus, judges 
awarded substantially less when the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to 
satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for federal diversity 
jurisdiction (which plainly was met on the facts) than when no such motion was 
filed.  In the view of Guthrie et al., “the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum 
anchored their damage awards.”80  Further, judges’ predictions of the likely out-
come of a case on appeal were highly sensitive to what they were told about the 
actual outcome, which, according to Guthrie et al., was an illustration of hind-
sight bias.81 
A study by W. Kip Viscusi and Reid Hastie found judges to be less subject 
to hindsight bias than mock jurors.82  The authors distributed a questionnaire to 
a sample of state-court judges (both trial and appellate) attending a law-and-
economics program.  They received ninety-five responses, a response rate of 
almost 100%.  They then administered the same questionnaire to mock jurors, 
to facilitate comparison.  In a pair of tests for hindsight bias, Viscusi and Hastie 
found that the judges “were much less prone to hindsight bias than are jurors in 
their treatment of corporate safety decisions.  Indeed, in making legal judg-
ments, there was little effect of hindsight for judges, as compared to substantial 
effects for mock jurors.”83 
Several commentators have criticized the sample of judges studied by 
Viscusi and Hastie.  Guthrie et al. assert that the sample and the context “may 
have induced somewhat more calculated reasoning processes that dampened 
the effect.”84  Richard Lempert likewise criticizes the sample of judges, asserting 
that the program “may well have attracted judges who are more pro-business 
 
 78. Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 809-11. 
 79. Id. at 787-94, 799-805.  Unlike the Viscusi and the Hastie and Viscusi studies, see infra text accom-
panying notes 82-83, Guthrie et al. did not administer a similar questionnaire to mock jurors.  Indeed, at 
least some of the questions they asked required decisions that a jury would not make.  See, e.g., id. at 791 
(describing an anchoring question requiring magistrate judges to rule on a motion to dismiss for want of 
subject matter jurisdiction).  Instead, Guthrie et al. compared the magnitude of the biases they found to 
the magnitude found in other studies, based on different fact patterns, id. at 816-18, making it difficult to 
draw any firm conclusions about comparability.  See Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?, supra 
note 5, at 1998 n.184. 
 80. Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 791-92. 
 81. Id. at 802-03. 
 82. Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s Performance as a Risk 
Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901 (1998); Viscusi, supra note 40.  The results of the study were published 
separately by Viscusi and by Viscusi and Hastie together. 
 83. Viscusi, supra note 40, at 59; Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 82, at 917.  Viscusi and Hastie also 
examined risk assessment by judges, concluding that while “judges did exhibit many of the patterns of 
biases in risk judgments that have been the focus of the literature on the rationality of choice under uncer-
tainty,” in general, “these biases do not contaminate the thinking of judges with respect to their 
interpretation of legal rules.”  Viscusi, supra note 40, at 60; see also W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the 
Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 135 (2001) (finding that “[j]udges had more 
accurate risk beliefs and were less prone to overestimate low-probability events” than were jurors). 
 84. Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 818 n.201; see also Robbennolt, supra note 75, at 335. 
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than judges generally.”85  Lempert is also critical that the sample included both 
trial judges and appellate judges because “[t]rial judges, as a group, may have 
different values or, because their experiences differ, they may respond differ-
ently in hindsight.”86  While perhaps underestimating the susceptibility of judges 
generally to hindsight bias, at a minimum, the study suggests that some judges 
are able to avoid this bias.  As such, it also suggests that some arbitrators may 
be able to avoid hindsight bias as well. 
2. Studies of Litigation Outcomes 
While experimental studies are able to control for the underlying facts of the 
dispute, studies of real-world litigation outcomes avoid charges of lack of real-
ism.87  This section examines several studies that compare outcomes (either win 
rates or damage awards) in cases decided by judges and juries, to see the extent 
to which experimental differences in judicial versus jury decisionmaking may 
affect real cases. 
The earliest and best-known study seeking to compare outcomes between 
judges and juries is Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel’s University of Chicago Jury 
Project.88  Kalven and Zeisel collected reports on 4000 civil jury verdicts and 
then asked each judge “how he would have decided the case had it been tried to 
him alone.”89  They found that in 78% of the cases, the judge agreed with the 
jury’s verdict on liability.  In 12%, the jury found for the plaintiff while the 
judge would have found for the defendant.  In the remaining 10%, the jury 
found for the defendant while the judge would have found for the plaintiff.90  
Juries, however, awarded significantly higher damages.  Of the cases in which 
the judge agreed with the jury’s finding for the plaintiff (44%), on average the 
jury-awarded damages were 20% higher than what the judge would have 
awarded.91  One weakness with the methodology is that the judges were asked 
whether they agreed with the jury’s verdict after it was rendered, rather than 
being asked before the verdict what they thought the outcome should be.  Thus, 
“it is possible that their responses partially reflected their attitudes toward the 
jury system in addition to their evaluation of the cases at hand.”92  The study has 
 
 85. Lempert, supra note 44, at 884.  For a response, see Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, Juries, Hind-
sight, and Punitive Damages Awards: Reply to Richard Lempert, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 987 (2002). 
 86. Lempert, supra note 44, at 884. 
 87. See supra Part II.B.  Such studies also necessarily control for differences in the structural charac-
teristics of the various dispute-resolution processes, which experimental studies can do only imperfectly at 
best.  See infra Part IV. 
 88. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63-64 (1966).  The focus of 
THE AMERICAN JURY, however, is on juries in criminal cases.  Id. at 55-81. 
 89. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1063 (1964). 
 90. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 88, at 63-64; see also Kalven, supra note 89, at 1065 (reporting 
79% agreement in personal injury cases). 
 91. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 88, at 64 n.13; Kalven, supra note 89 at 1065. 
 92. MacCoun, supra note 4, at 165.  For other criticisms, see Michael H. Walsh, The American Jury: A 
Reassessment, 79 YALE L.J. 142, 146-47 (1969) (pointing out that the “sample used was not statistically 
ideal”). 
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the advantage, however, of ensuring that the cases evaluated by the jury and the 
judge were identical. 
Other studies of litigation outcomes have been much less able to control for 
case characteristics.  Thus, they are potentially subject to serious selection 
effects that make interpretation of the results difficult.93  For example, in a 
sample of federal court cases decided between 1979 and 1989, Kevin M. Cler-
mont and Theodore Eisenberg found a number of categories of cases in which 
plaintiffs had higher win rates before judges than before juries.94  They con-
cluded that “the most plausible explanation of the data lies in small differences 
between judges’ and juries’ treatment of cases and, more importantly, in the 
parties’ varying the selection of cases that reach judge and jury.”95  A subse-
quent study by Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok, using a sample of state-
court verdicts, found that “[j]uries do grant systematically larger awards to 
injured plaintiffs than judges.”96  Most of the difference, they found, was due to 
differential routing of cases to judges and juries: 
The differences in judge and jury decision-making we have discovered, however, 
explain only one-quarter to one-third of the difference in average award rates across 
judges and juries.  Three[-]quarters to two-thirds of the difference in average awards is 
due not to differences in decision-making but to differences in the sample of cases 
appearing before judges and juries.97 
Of course, the same results could be restated with the opposite emphasis: up to 
one-third of the difference between awards by judges and juries persists even 
after attempting to control for case-selection effects. 
A recent study by Theodore Eisenberg et al. focused on the award of puni-
tive damages by judges and jurors.98  They considered a sample of state-court 
jury trials from forty-five of the seventy-five most populous counties in the 
United States from 1996, and found that “[j]uries and judges award punitive 
damages at about the same rate, and their punitive awards bear about the same 
relation to their compensatory awards.”99  While they found somewhat greater 
variance in jury awards, “the effect is not robust and leads to very few jury puni-
tive awards outside the range of what judges are expected to award.”100  Joni 
Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi, using the same data as Eisenberg et al., reached a 
strikingly different conclusion: 
 
 93. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1984); Joel Waldfogel, Selection of Cases for Trial, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 419 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
 94. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial By Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 
CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1137-38 (1992). 
 95. Id. at 1126.  For an alternative interpretation of their results, see Richard A. Posner, An Eco-
nomic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1501 (1999). 
 96. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Runaway Judges? Selection Effects and the Jury, 16 J.L. & 
ECON. ORG. 306, 330 (2000). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 
CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002). 
 99. Id. at 779. 
 100. Id. 
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What we found based on a careful statistical analysis was that these data are quite con-
sistent with there being greater restraint by judges.  Our statistical analysis of the level 
of punitive damages awards for all cases, including those with compensatory damages 
but no punitive awards, showed that juries award higher levels of punitive damages.  If 
one considers the components of this effect, juries also differ from judges.  Juries have 
a higher probability of awarding punitive damages.  Moreover, juries are especially 
likely to make a large punitive damages award conditional on there being a punitive 
damages award.  Thus, juries are more prone to generate large awards than are 
judges.101 
The differing results, according to Hersch and Viscusi, were the result of the 
two studies treating trials from one county differently and Eisenberg et al.’s use 
of two jury variables highly correlated with one another.102 
A final study by Eisenberg (with different coauthors) focused directly on 
cognitive differences between judges and juries and found more coherence in 
punitive damages awards than behavioral theories would predict.103  The cogni-
tive problem considered was one of “scaling without a modulus”: the difficulty 
of translating moral judgments about behavior into a quantitative damages 
award.104  The authors found (using the same state-court jury sample as above)105 
some incoherence in punitive damages awards of the sort predicted by the 
theory, but far less than experimental studies would indicate.106  They concluded 
that “[f]orces seem to be at work that already promote coherence,” so structural 
changes suggested by some commentators (such as shifting punitive damages 
decisionmaking from juries to judges)107 may be unnecessary.108 
C. Conclusions 
The existing evidence on the effect of cognitive illusions on arbitral deci-
sionmaking is slight.  Drawing from studies of judicial decisionmaking (on the 
assumption that arbitrators are more like judges than jurors), however, provides 
 
 101. JONI HERSCH & W. KIP VISCUSI, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JUDGES AND JURIES PERFORM 36 
(Harvard-John M. Olin Discussion Paper No. 362, May 2002). 
 102. Id. at 31-34 (explaining that the differing results were due to the disparate treatment of Harris 
County, Texas, and Eisenberg et al.’s use of “both a jury indicator variable as well as the interaction of 
jury trial with compensatory damages,” which served “to induce multicollinearity”). 
 103. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Reconciling Experimental Incoherence with Real-World Coherence in 
Punitive Damages, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1239 (2002). 
 104. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in 
Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998); Sunstein et al., supra note 40, at 1155; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 142-44.  
According to Sunstein et al., one consequence is that while decisions may be “sensible and coherent” 
within a category of cases, they become incoherent when compared across categories of cases.  Sunstein et 
al., supra note 40, at 1170.  Decisionmakers who see multiple categories of cases (for example, judges and 
perhaps arbitrators) thus may make better decisions than decisionmakers who see only one case (for 
example, juries).  Id. 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102. 
 106. Eisenberg et al. tested the following predictions they derived from the theory: (1) “the relation 
between punitive and compensatory awards will not meaningfully vary across case categories in actual jury 
cases”; and (2) “‘case categories’ influence should be greater in judge-tried cases than in jury-tried cases.”  
Eisenberg et al., supra note 103, at 1248.  They found “modest support” for these predictions in the data.  
Id. 
 107. See supra text accompanying note 40. 
 108. Eisenberg et al., supra note 103, at 1259. 
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further insights.  The experimental studies of judges and jurors, while certainly 
not conclusive, find that judges are less subject to some cognitive biases and 
heuristics than jurors and equally, but no more, subject to others.  Although 
studies of litigation outcomes suggest that the effect of cognitive illusions is less 
than might be expected, some differences in outcome seem to persist.  As such, 
the studies suggest (albeit tentatively) that arbitral decisionmaking, to the 
extent it is like judicial decisionmaking, is less subject than jury decisionmaking 
to some cognitive illusions, and equally subject to others.109 
IV 
STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN  
JURY TRIALS AND ARBITRATION 
Part III suggested a tentative conclusion about the effects of cognitive biases 
and heuristics on arbitral decisionmaking, based largely (although not exclu-
sively) on experimental studies: arbitrators may be less subject to at least some 
cognitive illusions than are jurors.  This Part examines various structural differ-
ences between jury trials and arbitration proceedings and considers whether the 
differences are likely to increase or decrease the effects of cognitive illusions. 
A. Group Versus Individual Decisionmaking 
A key difference between juries and arbitrators is in the decisionmaking 
dynamic.  Arbitrators decide either alone or in panels of three,110 whereas juries 
decide in groups varying from six to twelve members.111  Most experimental 
studies of jury behavior ignore the possible effects of group deliberations and 
focus on the decisionmaking of individual jurors.112  Others select “synthetic 
 
 109. If arbitral decisionmaking bears at least some relationship to decisionmaking by judges, one might 
ask why businesses use arbitration clauses rather than jury-trial waivers in their standard-form contracts.  
There are several possible explanations.  First, arbitral decisionmaking may be less subject to biases and 
heuristics than judicial decisionmaking, perhaps because of market competition or the subject-matter 
expertise of arbitrators.  Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adap-
tation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 64 (2000) (“Judges surely have some incentives to make good law and avoid 
illusions of judgment, but they lack the incentives that other institutions face.”); Posner, supra note 95, at 
1494 (“The literature on these illusions provides some basis for thinking that market settings tend to dispel 
or at least reduce them, but none for thinking that government processes have similar effects.”).  Second, 
businesses might be indifferent between judges and arbitrators (or perhaps even prefer judges), but use 
arbitration clauses because courts are unwilling to enforce predispute waivers of the right to jury trial.  See 
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration, supra note 11, at 677-95; Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, 
Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 167, 200-04 (Winter/Spring 2004) (describing court decisions requiring knowing consent to enforce 
provisions purporting to waiver a party’s jury-trial rights).  Third, other factors, such as the availability of 
class relief and confidentiality, may—and certainly do, to some extent—lead businesses to prefer 
arbitration over bench trials. 
 110. E.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule R-15 (effective July 
1, 2003) [hereinafter AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES]. 
 111. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 278, 
tbl. 42 (1998).  For an overview of research on the effects of jury size, see SWARD, supra note 12, at 215-18. 
 112. See David R. Shaffer & Shannon R. Wheatman, Does Personality Influence Reactions to Judicial 
Instructions? Some Preliminary Findings and Possible Implications, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 655, 657 
(2000) (“[P]erhaps the greatest limitation of mock-trial simulations is that the vast majority of them 
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juries” that combine individual respondents into jury panels and then use the 
median response as the verdict of the synthetic jury.113  While such an approach 
tends to mitigate the effect of outlying responses, it does not take into account 
the dynamics of group deliberations and any effect they may have on actual 
verdicts. 
If group decisions differ from individual decisions, these differences in deci-
sionmaking dynamics could be an important structural differences between jury 
trials and arbitration.  One possibility is that group deliberations dampen the 
effect of cognitive illusions on jury verdicts because discussions within the group 
improve the accuracy of the group’s decision.  Because arbitrators decide alone 
or in small groups, there is no, or at least less, opportunity for group delibera-
tions to reduce the effect of cognitive illusions on arbitration awards.  On the 
other hand, group polarization may result in group decisions that are more 
extreme than the median of the individual members’ views.114  If so, jury verdicts 
may be more extreme than predicted by experimental studies, while arbitral 
decisionmaking would be much less affected. 
The empirical evidence on the point is mixed.115  At least some studies, how-
ever, have found that deliberations can exacerbate, rather than lessen, cognitive 
biases in decisionmaking.116  For example, in an experimental study of punitive 
damages awards, David Schkade and others found that jury deliberations 
tended to result in more extreme verdicts: when individual jurors rated behav-
 
attempt to draw inferences from decisions rendered by nondeliberating mock jurors rather than deliber-
ating mock juries.”). 
 113. E.g., VIDMAR, supra note 67, at 226-28; Viscusi, supra note 83, at 124. 
 114. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 
71, 85-97 (2000) (discussing group polarization). 
 115. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 
687, 713 (1996); Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Jurors vs. Bias in Juries: New Evidence from the SDS Per-
spective, 80 ORG’L BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 70, 82 (1999) (“For the jury, our findings con-
firm what is evident in the empirical record—that there is probably no general answer to the question 
‘which is more biased, jurors or juries?’  The answer to this question must be ‘it depends.’”); see, e.g., 
Dagmar Stahlberg & Frank Eller, We Knew It All Along: Hindsight Bias in Groups, 63 ORG’L BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 46, 56 (1995) (finding that “groups are as prone to hindsight bias as individu-
als when making hypothetical predictions,” but rejecting the suggestion of greater hindsight bias in 
groups).  For studies finding benefits of jury deliberations, see, for example, Kamala London & Narina 
Nunez, The Effect of Jury Deliberations on Jurors’ Propensity to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence, 85 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 932, 937 (2000) (“[S]tudies find that individuals are biased when exposed to inadmis-
sible evidence.  However, the results [here], as well as results from other research, suggest that jury delib-
erations may somehow moderate the effect of biasing factors.”); James H. Davis et al., Effects of Group 
Size and Procedural Influence on Consensual Judgments of Quantity: The Example of Damage Awards 
and Mock Civil Juries, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 703, 714 (1997) (reporting the “surprising” 
result that “groups awarded less than preferred by parallel individuals working alone, although this differ-
ence is only marginally significant”).  See generally MICHAEL J. SAKS, SMALL-GROUP DECISION MAKING 
AND COMPLEX INFORMATION TASKS 3 (1981) (“The legal fact-finding task, especially in complex cases, 
seems to be of the type in which, ceteris paribus, large heterogeneous groups perform better than individu-
als.”). 
 116. E.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Conse-
quences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 553-57 (1992); Martin F. 
Kaplan & Charles E. Miller, Group Decision Making and Normative Versus Informational Influence: 
Effects of Type of Issue and Assigned Decision Rule, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 306, 311 
(1987). 
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ior as worthy of strong punishment, deliberation increased the overall jury 
rating; when individual jurors rated behavior as worthy only of weak punish-
ment, deliberation tended to decrease the overall jury rating.117  As applied to 
punitive damages, when individual jurors favored large awards of punitive dam-
ages, deliberations increased the amount awarded by the jury.  Indeed, Schkade 
et al. reported that 27% of mock juries voting to award punitive damages 
awarded amounts as great or greater than the highest individual award before 
deliberations.118  Similar effects have been identified in studies of decisionmak-
ing by federal appellate courts.119 
Thus, at least some evidence indicates that group deliberations do not 
reduce and may actually heighten the effects of cognitive illusions on decision-
making. Other evidence suggests that deliberations might moderate such 
effects.120  The bottom line is uncertain. 
B. Markets and Incentives 
Jurors are selected randomly and paid a small, fixed fee.121  Their “financial 
incentive to conduct a careful sifting of the evidence is nil.”122  Arbitrators, by 
comparison, get paid only if selected to serve, and must compete with other 
arbitrators to be selected.  This market competition gives arbitrators different 
incentives from juries, which may improve the quality of their decisionmaking 
by inducing greater care.123 
The broader question is whether these sorts of market forces are sufficient 
to mitigate the effects of heuristics and cognitive biases.  Richard Posner writes 
that “[t]he literature on [cognitive] illusions provides some basis for thinking 
that market settings tend to dispel or at least reduce them.”124  Selection effects 
 
 117. David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 
1140 (2000). 
 118. Id. at 1155-56 (finding 10% were higher than the highest individual award and 17% equal to the 
highest individual award).  They also found greater variability in awards by deliberating juries, and con-
cluded: “This finding suggests, though it certainly does not prove, the possibility that juries will produce 
more variability in awards than judges (a suggestion supported by the possibility that judicial experience 
with a wider range of cases will introduce the equivalent of a ‘modulus’ by which to discipline dollar 
awards).”  Id. at 1148 n.43. 
 119. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Richard L. Revesz, Envi-
ronmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1755 (1997). 
 120. See supra note 115. 
 121. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 111, at 269, tbl. 40. 
 122. Posner, supra note 95, at 1497.  This is not to say that juries do not take their responsibilities seri-
ously, merely that they have no financial incentive to do so. 
 123. See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL 127-33 (1980); Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives 
of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107, 107 (1983); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 
Trial Courts: An Economic Perspective, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 533, 545 (1990); Christopher R. Drahozal, 
Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV. 469, 502 (1998); Stephen Walt, Decision by 
Division: The Contractarian Structure of Commercial Arbitration, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 369, 411 (1999). 
 124. Posner, supra note 95, at 1494; see also Sunstein, supra note 5, at 150 (“In some circumstances, 
market forces are indeed strong enough to make behavioral economics irrelevant for predictive purposes.  
Then the question becomes whether it is possible to identify those circumstances.  This is a large question, 
and we lack authoritative answers.”).  For a pair of recent studies, see John A. List, Does Market Experi-
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that reduce cognitive illusions are more likely in market settings,125 and the 
greater amount at stake may lead to less biased results than experimental stud-
ies find, although the evidence on this point is uncertain.126  Other commenta-
tors, however, are skeptical that the market has sufficient corrective effect.127 
Moreover, competition among arbitrators also gives rise to the possibility of 
“repeat player” bias, in which arbitrators have an incentive to favor parties who 
are more likely to provide future business.128  To date, however, the evidence is 
inconclusive on whether such bias exists.129 
Lisa Bingham found a “repeat player effect” in a sample of 270 AAA 
employment arbitration awards issued in 1993 and 1994.130  Employees were 
awarded some recovery in 63% of all awards, but in only 16% of awards against 
repeat player employers—which Bingham defined as employers who were par-
ties to more than one award in the sample.  Employees recovered 48% of their 
demands against non-repeat player employers, but only 11% of their demands 
against repeat player employers.131  Bingham made clear that there were several 
possible explanations for these results, including that there were “systematic 
differences in the merits of these cases, in that employees in repeat player cases 
 
ence Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q.J. ECON. 41, 70 (2003) (“I find strong evidence that individual 
behavior converges to the neoclassical prediction as trading experience intensifies.”); JOHN A. LIST, 
NEOCLASSICAL THEORY VERSUS PROSPECT THEORY: EVIDENCE FROM THE MARKETPLACE 3 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9736, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9736 
(“Overall, the data pattern observed suggests that the learning process at work is one where the psycho-
logical effects at the heart of prospect theory are gradually attenuated: experienced agents are more 
willing to part with their endowments than lesser-experienced agents.”). 
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42. 
 126. See, e.g., Vernon L. Smith & James M. Walker, Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experi-
mental Economics, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 245, 259 (1993) (“A survey of experimental papers which report 
data on the comparative effects of subject monetary awards (including no rewards) shows a tendency for 
the error variance of the observations around the predicted optimal level to decline with increased mone-
tary reward.”); Dan N. Stone & David A. Ziebart, A Model of Financial Incentive Effects in Decision 
Making, 61 ORG’L BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 250, 259 (1995) (“[R]esults support the con-
tention that financial incentives are no panacea for eliminating decision biases.  Instead, incentives appear 
to increase the extent of attention given to a task, but also to increase potentially distracting emotions.”).  
See generally Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A 
Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1999) (“The studies 
show the effects of incentives are mixed and complicated.”); Mitchell, Equal Incompetence, supra note 5, 
at 71-80 (“Sometimes decisions with material consequences are the same as decisions without material 
consequences; sometimes they are different.”). 
 127. E.g., Langevoort, supra note 5, at 1523. 
 128. E.g., Rau, supra note 48, at 521-29; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 60-61; Sternlight, supra note 1, at 
685.  See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).  As Gordon Tullock has explained, however, the incentive of 
arbitrators to please repeat players does not necessarily mean that they will rule in favor of the repeat 
players.  TULLOCK, supra note 123, at 127-28 (“[A] bias toward the [repeat-player] retailer might be the 
arbitrator’s profit-maximizing course of action.  It might not, however, because the retailer might be inter-
ested in his general reputation and want an arbitrator who was either impartial or, for that matter, actually 
pro-customer.”). 
 129. Walt, supra note 123, at 418. 
 130. Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 46, at 189-90. 
 131. Id. at 213. 
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may have weaker legal claims, while employees in the non-repeat player cases 
may have stronger legal claims.”132 
In a follow-up study based on 203 AAA employment arbitration awards 
from 1993 to 1995, Bingham obtained similar results.133  She concluded, how-
ever, that “these patterns largely correspond with differences in the nature of 
the basis for arbitration.” According to Bingham, “[r]epeat player employers 
get to arbitration based on an implied contract stemming from a personnel 
manual or employee handbook,” cases in which the employee “may have a sub-
stantively weaker legal claim.”134  In short, the repeat player effect Bingham has 
identified seems to have had more to do with the strength of the repeat player 
employer’s claim (and, perhaps, ability to screen cases) than with the incentives 
facing the arbitrator.  In a subsequent study, Bingham and Simon Sarraf com-
pared outcomes before and after the Employment Due Process Protocol,135 and 
found that “employers arbitrating pursuant to an adhesive personnel handbook 
arbitration clause are less successful in employment arbitration after the Proto-
col than before.”136  They concluded that “[s]elf-regulation through the Due 
Process Protocol is making a difference in the outcomes of employment arbitra-
tion.”137 
Thus, the available empirical evidence on the relationship between markets 
and arbitral decisionmaking is inconclusive.  While there is reason to believe 
that market forces may reduce the effect of cognitive illusions on arbitral deci-
sionmaking, the results of existing studies are far from conclusive.  Conversely, 
while arbitrators may have an incentive to favor repeat players in their awards, 
the limited evidence of a repeat player effect seems to be due to case selection 
by the parties and not bias on the part of the arbitrators.  Overall, then, no 
definitive answer is possible. 
C. Other Differences 
There are a variety of other structural differences between arbitration pro-
ceedings and jury trials that could correct for, or exacerbate, the effect of cogni-
tive illusions on legal decisionmaking.  The following are a sample. 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Bingham, Unequal Bargaining Power, supra note 46, at 38-39; see also Bingham, On Repeat Play-
ers, supra note 46, at 223. 
 134. Bingham, Unequal Bargaining Power, supra note 46, at 39-40. 
 135. TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT, A DUE PROCESS 
PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE 
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995), available at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15717&JSP 
src=upload/LIVESITE/focusArea/employment/protocol.html.  The Protocol establishes minimum stan-
dards of procedural fairness for employment arbitration proceedings.  The American Arbitration Associa-
tion was involved in the drafting of the Protocol.  The AAA states that its employment arbitration rules 
comply with the Protocol and that it may refuse to administer arbitration proceedings under any program 
that “substantially and materially” departs from the Protocol.  AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, NATIONAL 
RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (effective Nov. 1, 2002). 
 136. Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 46; see also Bingham, Self-Determination, supra note 46, at 873. 
 137. Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 46. 
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1. Fees 
To file a lawsuit, a plaintiff merely pays a small filing fee (in addition to 
paying his or her own lawyer, on a contingency basis or otherwise).138  No other 
charge is made by the public court system; judges’ salaries and other administra-
tive costs are paid by the government.  By comparison, a claimant filing a 
demand for arbitration pays fees both to any arbitration institution providing 
administrative services and to the arbitrator or arbitrators resolving the dis-
pute.139  As a general matter, the fees are graduated, increasing as the amount 
sought by the claimant increases. 
The policy discussions140 and court cases141 dealing with arbitration fees con-
sider the extent to which such fees might preclude individuals from asserting 
claims in arbitration.  The focus here, however, is on a different consequence of 
arbitration fees: their effect on party behavior in the arbitration proceeding.  As 
discussed above, a number of experimental studies have found that the amounts 
claimed by plaintiffs have a strong anchoring effect on jury verdicts.142  In court, 
the plaintiff has little financial incentive to moderate damages claims.  In arbi-
tration, however, a claimant has a significant financial incentive to be realistic 
about damages claims because of the graduated fees charged by most arbitra-
tion institutions.143  Claimants who ask for more have to pay more, which may 
counteract to some degree any bias resulting from anchoring on the amount 
sought.144 
2. Rules of Evidence 
Detailed rules govern the admissibility and presentation of evidence in 
court.  By contrast, formal rules of evidence ordinarily do not apply in arbitra-
tion.145  Further, despite having the power to exclude irrelevant evidence,146 arbi-
 
 138. E.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 43 (2002), available at 
http://www.publiccitizen.org/documents/ACF110A.pdf. 
 139. 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 3.2.2.2, at 3:13 (1999). 
 140. E.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 138, at 42; Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. 
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 384-85; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 61. 
 141. E.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 
Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 142. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 143. The fee structure in arbitration provides an alternative explanation for Maltby’s findings, see 
supra text accompanying notes 61-63, that arbitration claimants recover a higher percentage of their 
demands than do plaintiffs in federal court.  See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS 7 (2002) (“Given that the fees parties pay in arbitration are based 
on the amount demanded, [Maltby’s] numbers may reflect no more than the fact that parties in arbitration 
have a strong incentive to be more realistic about their initial demands than parties in court.”). 
 144. Of course, arbitration fees may be higher or lower than necessary to result in an optimal damage 
claim by the claimant. 
 145. See, e.g., AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 110, Rule R-31(a); NATIONAL 
ARBITRATION FORUM CODE OF PROCEDURE, Rule 35(C) (July 1, 2003); JAMS EMPLOYMENT 
ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES, Rule 20(d) (revised Apr. 2003) [hereinafter JAMS 
EMPLOYMENT RULES].  Parties can and sometimes do contract for rules of evidence to apply in arbitra-
tion proceedings, but such contract provisions are rare.  See Drahozal, supra note 8, at 731 (reporting that 
three clauses in a sample of thirty-four arbitration clauses in franchise agreements provided for the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence to govern in arbitration proceedings). 
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trators have a “well documented” tendency to “let it all in.”147  The gatekeeping 
function of the trial judge over the admission of evidence “is one way of com-
bating cognitive illusions.”148  For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which 
provides that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not admissible to 
prove negligence or other wrongful conduct,149 “reveals a good understanding 
of . . . hindsight bias and the judicial ability to respond to it.”150  The absence of 
rules of evidence in arbitration may increase the relative susceptibility of arbi-
tral decisionmaking to hindsight bias.151 
3. Appellate Review 
Court rules provide for some degree of substantive oversight of jury ver-
dicts, such as by permitting judges to grant a new trial or a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict.152  Courts exercise especially stringent scrutiny over awards 
of punitive damages.153  Indeed, studies show that a significant percentage of 
punitive damages awards by juries are modified or set aside,154 suggesting that 
courts take their supervisory role seriously.  Both jury verdicts and bench-trial 
verdicts are subject to review by appellate courts, with factual findings subject 
to some degree of deference and legal issues reviewable de novo.  The avail-
ability of appellate review may correct errors resulting from cognitive biases,155 
give judges the incentive to avoid errors in the first place,156 and provide feed-
back useful in avoiding future errors.157  By comparison, only very limited 
 
 146. See, e.g., AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 110, Rule R-31(b); JAMS 
EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 145, Rule 20(d). 
 147. 3 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 139, § 35.1.2.4, at 35:9. 
 148. Posner, supra note 95, at 1494. 
 149. FED. R. EVID. 407. 
 150. Rachlinski, supra note 14, at 617-18.  Rachlinski argues, however, that as a general matter keeping 
evidence from the jury “probably cannot cure the hindsight bias” because “[t]o avoid the influence of the 
bias, the evidence that needs to be suppressed is the very fact that some adverse event led to a lawsuit.”  
Id. at 605. 
 151. Cf. Posner, supra note 95, at 1494 (“If judges as well as jurors are prone to make cognitive errors 
or be overcome by emotion, trial by jury may actually proceed more rationally than trial by judge, since in 
a bench trial there is no gatekeeper protecting the trier of fact from confusing or excessively prejudicial 
evidence.”). 
 152. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 50, 59; see also SWARD, supra note 12, at 271-99. 
 153. E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1986). 
 154. E.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 94 (1991) (concluding that “plaintiffs 
received only . . . 29% of the original punitive award” due to reduction on appeal or settlement after ver-
dict); Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-verdict Adjustment of Those 
Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265 (1998) (finding many outlier compensatory damage verdicts reduced 
after verdict). 
 155. Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 
(1995). 
 156. Drahozal, supra note 123, at 492. 
 157. David A. Schkade, Erratic by Design: A Task Analysis of Punitive Damages Assessment, 39 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 121, 130 (2002) (“Jurors get neither rewards nor feedback based on their decisions.”) 
(italics omitted). 
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appellate review is available for arbitration awards.158  Courts will vacate awards 
only on narrow procedural grounds159 or for manifest disregard of the law.160  
Thus, in arbitration there is far less opportunity to avoid any errors resulting 
from heuristics or cognitive biases through appellate review than there is in 
court.161 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Businesses cite arbitration as a way to avoid aberrant jury verdicts, implicitly 
if not explicitly assuming that arbitrators make “better” decisions than juries.  
By contrast, consumer advocates criticize arbitration as a way for businesses to 
avoid paying damages to deserving claimants, effectively assuming that juries 
make better decisions than arbitrators.  These conflicting perspectives pose an 
important question in the debate over predispute arbitration clauses in con-
sumer contracts: How do decisions by arbitrators compare to decisions by 
juries? 
From a behavioral perspective, arbitral decisionmaking appears to be less 
subject to cognitive illusions than decisionmaking by juries.  This is not an 
across-the-board conclusion about the superiority of arbitral decisionmaking, 
but rather a tentative conclusion about the effect of heuristics and cognitive 
biases on two modes of legal decisionmaking.  It is based largely on experimen-
tal studies of decisionmaking by judges, and it recognizes that the comparison 
between judges and arbitrators is not perfect and that drawing real-world con-
clusions from experimental results is difficult.  If arbitral decisionmaking in fact 
proves to be less subject to cognitive illusions than jury decisionmaking, it 
would provide some evidence that arbitrators may make “better,” or at least no 
worse, decisions than juries. 
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this analysis, however, is that 
more research is needed on how cognitive illusions affect arbitral decisionmak-
ing.  Commentators have already called for studies on the psychology of dispute 
resolution in the international arbitration context.162  Neil Vidmar and Lisa 
 
 158. Parties may, however, provide by contract for an appellate arbitral tribunal.  See, e.g., JAMS 
EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 145, Rule 30 & Optional Arbitration Appeal Procedure. 
 159. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000 & Supp. 2003).  See generally 4 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 139, § 40 
(discussing the grounds for vacating arbitration awards). 
 160. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (“[T]he interpretations of the law by the arbitra-
tors in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in 
interpretation.”) 
 161. For an incentives-based explanation for the lack of an appeals process in commercial arbitration, 
see Drahozal, supra note 123, at 502. 
 162. See Shari Seidman Diamond, The Psychological Aspects of Dispute Resolution: Issues for Interna-
tional Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY 
QUESTIONS 327, 342 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2003) (suggesting a research agenda that would “sys-
tematically observe . . . and analyze . . . actual behavior and the decision-making process” in international 
arbitration, comparable to recent study of jury deliberations); Christopher R. Drahozal, Of Rabbits and 
Rhinoceri: A Survey of Empirical Research on International Commercial Arbitration, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 23, 
32-33 (2003). 
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Bingham have both used arbitrators as experimental subjects while examining 
other issues.163  Studies of cognitive illusions in the context of consumer arbitra-
tion would be of great interest and practical importance as well. 
Experimental studies have the clear benefit of holding constant the facts 
facing the decisionmaker.  Problems would need to be developed (preferably 
with significant detail and context provided to the decisionmaker) to test for the 
effect of various cognitive illusions, such as hindsight bias, anchoring, the repre-
sentativeness heuristic, and extremeness aversion.  Conferences attended by 
arbitrators would be an obvious place to administer the problems.  They also 
could be administered by mail, although the response rate almost certainly 
would be lower.  To facilitate comparisons, the problems should be adminis-
tered to mock jurors as well.  Such experimental studies would provide a good 
starting point for the behavioral analysis of arbitral decisionmaking, as well as 
contributing to a comparison of decisionmaking by arbitrators and juries.164 
 
 163. Lisa B. Bingham & Debra J. Mesch, Decision Making in Employment and Labor Arbitration, 39 
INDUS. REL. 671 (2000) (reporting the results of an experimental study comparing labor and employment 
arbitrators); see Vidmar & Rice, supra note 42, at 890-91. 
 164. Studies of outcomes in arbitration proceedings, testing for the effect of cognitive illusions, likewise 
would be of interest, but would be far more difficult to design.  Problems of case selection and ensuring 
comparable facts make studies of arbitration outcomes—particularly any attempts to compare arbitration 
awards to jury verdicts—highly problematic.  See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical 
and Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735, 757 
(2001) (“Empirical studies are vulnerable to the possibility that the studied cases going to arbitration are 
systematically different from the studied cases going to litigation.  This will remain true as long as the law 
allows contracts to determine whether or not a case goes to arbitration.”). 
